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Abstract—This paper studies the information-theoretic secrecy
performance in large-scale cellular networks based on a stochas-
tic geometry framework. The locations of both base stations and
the mobile users are modeled as independent two-dimensional
Poisson point processes. We consider a key feature of the cellular
network, namely, information exchange between base stations,
and characterize its impact on the achievable secrecy rate of
an arbitrary downlink transmission with a certain portion of
the mobile users acting as potential eavesdroppers. In particular,
analytical results are presented under diverse assumptions on the
availability of eavesdroppers’ location information at the serving
base station, which captures the benefit from the exchange of
mobile users’ location information between base stations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication security is always a crucial issue for cellu-
lar systems. Traditionally, most of security techniques in mod-
ern cellular standards involve means of encryption algorithms
in the upper layers of the protocol stacks [1]. In contrast, the
concept of achieving information-theoretic security by protect-
ing physical layer of wireless networks has attracted attention
widely in the research community. Wyner proposed the wiretap
channel model and the notion of perfect secrecy for point-to-
point communication in his pioneering work [2]. Based on
these initial results, the achievable secrecy rate, defined as
the maximum transmission rate at which the eavesdropper
is unable to obtain any information, can be achieved if the
intended receiver enjoys a better channel than the potential
eavesdropper.
Unlike point-to-point scenarios, the studies on the secure
communications in large-scale wireless networks have been
carried out recently, from the information-theoretic viewpoint.
Secrecy communication graphs describing secure connectiv-
ity over a large-scale network with eavesdroppers presented
were investigated in [3]–[7]. In order to derive the network
throughput, these works on connectivity were further extend-
ed for secrecy capacity analysis. Specifically, the maximum
achievable secrecy rate under the worst-case scenario with
colluding eavesdroppers was given in [8]. Scaling laws for
secrecy capacity in large networks have been investigated in
[9]–[11]. Focusing on the transmission capacity of secure com-
munications, the throughput cost of achieving a certain level
of security in an interference-limited network was analyzed
in [12]. It should be noticed that all works mentioned above
concentrated on ad hoc networks.
In this work, we focus on the secrecy performance in large-
scale cellular networks, considering cellular networks’ unique
characteristics different from ad hoc networks: the carrier-
operated high-speed backhaul networks connecting individu-
al base stations (BSs) and the core-network infrastructures,
which provide us potential means of BS cooperation, such as
exchanging information to guarantee better secure links.
Fortunately, modeling BSs to be randomly placed points in
a plane and utilizing stochastic geometry [13] [14] to analyze
cellular networks has been used extensively as an analytical
tool for improving tractability [15]–[17]. Recent works [18]–
[21] have shown that the network models with BS locations
drawn from a homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP) are
as accurate as the traditional grid models compared to the
result of an practical network deployment, and can provide
more tractable analytical results which give pessimistic lower
bounds on coverage and throughput. For these reasons we
adopt PPPs to model the locations of BSs of the cellular
networks in this paper.
The following scenario of secure communication in cellular
networks is considered in this work: confidential messages
are prepared to be conveyed to a mobile user, while certain
other mobile users should not have the access to the messages
and hence are treated as potential eavesdroppers. The serving
BS should ensure the messages successfully delivered to
the intended user while keeping perfect secrecy against all
potential eavesdroppers. Considering the fact that the cellular
service area is divided into cells, each BS knows both the
location as well as the identity of each user (i.e., whether the
user is a potential eavesdropper or not) in its own cell. The
identity and location information of mobile users in other cells
can be obtained by information exchange between the BSs via
the backhaul networks.
Our contribution is that we provide probabilistic character-
izations of the secrecy rate and quantify the average secrecy
rate achievable for a randomly located mobile user in such a
cellular network. The serving BS acquires the potential eaves-
droppers’ locations via information exchange with neighboring
BSs. We analytically show how the achievable secrecy rate
increases as more nearby BSs participate in the information
exchange with the serving BS. This result provides network
designers with useful guidelines in deciding on the necessary
information exchange range to achieve the desired secrecy
performance.
It should be noted that similar work to evaluate secrecy
performance of large scale cellular networks was conducted
in [22]; however, it mainly focused on the scaling behavior
of the eavesdropper’s density to allow full coverage over the
entire network, without taking the achievable secrecy rate into
account. In contrast, we characterize the statistics of the secre-
cy rate at an arbitrary mobile user under different assumptions
on the information exchange of the eavesdroppers’ location .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we present the system model and general assumptions.
Section III shows the main result of this paper, in which
we obtain simple tractable expressions for achievable secrecy
rates. Section IV provides numerical results and concluding
remarks are given in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the downlink scenario of a cellular network uti-
lizing an orthogonal multiple access technique and composing
of a single class of BSs, macro BS for instance. We focus on
the performance achieved by a randomly chosen typical mobile
user. The BSs are assumed to be spatially distributed as a two-
dimensional homogeneous PPP ΦBS of density λBS , and all
BSs have the same transmit power value PBS . An independent
collection of mobile users, located according to an independent
homogeneous PPP ΦMS of density λMS , is considered. We
consider the process ΦMS ∪{0} obtained by adding a user to
the origin of the coordinate system, which is the typical user
under consideration. This is allowed by Slivnyak’s Theorem
[13] which states that the properties observed by a typical
point of the PPP ΦMS , is the same as those observed by node
at origin in the process ΦMS ∪ {0}.
A. Cell Association Model
In this analysis, we associate users to the nearest BS1, which
is commonly used in related cellular modeling works [15] [18].
Since each mobile user camps on the closest BS, equivalently,
a BS is associated with the users in its Voronoi cell (formed
by the PPP ΦBS), thus resulting the Voronoi tessellation [13]
for BS coverage areas, as shown in Fig. 1.
B. Signal Model
The standard power loss propagation model is used with
path loss exponent α > 2. Hence, the received power at the
receiver xi from the transmitter xj is written as
Prx(xi, xj) = PBS‖xi − xj‖
−α. (1)
1Note that in the presence of eavesdroppers, it is generally not optimal to
associate the mobile user to the nearest BS, since the nearest BS may not be
the one providing the maximum secrecy rate. For example, if the nearest BS is
closely surrounded by eavesdroppers whereas the second nearest BS does not
have any eavesdroppers located close by, it is better to associate the mobile
user to the second nearest BS. However, it is shown in the journal version of
this paper [23] that optimally selecting the BS for user association provide a
very marginal secrecy rate improvement over nearest BS association.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of Poisson distributed BSs’ cell boundaries. Each user is
associated with the nearest BS, and BSs (represented by green squares) are
distributed according to PPP.
The noise power is assumed to be additive and constant with
value σ2 for all users, but no specific distribution is assumed
in general.
In this work, we also assume there is no in-band interference
at downlink receivers. This assumption is achievable by a care-
fully planned frequency reuse pattern, where the interfering
BSs are far away to have the serving BS occupying some
resource blocks exclusively in a relatively large area, and the
interference can be incorporated in the constant noise power.
C. Location Information Exchange
We consider a scenario where confidential messages are
prepared to be delivered to the typical user, while certain
individuals among other mobile users, treated as potential
malicious eavesdroppers (or called Eve for brevity) by the
network, should be kept from accessing them. We model a
fraction of the other mobile users randomly chosen from ΦMS
(the process constructed by all other users except the typical
user) as the eavesdroppers, i.e. a thinned PPP Φe with the
density of λe.
Considering the backhaul bandwidth cost in practice and
core-network implementation complexity for BS cooperation,
each BS may only know the location and identity (i.e., whether
the user is a potential eavesdropper or not) of each mobile
user in its neighboring region, in which neighboring BSs
participating in the information exchange with the serving BS,
and the area outside the cells covered by these BSs is the
unknown region. By considering the worse case scenario that
the eavesdroppers can be located anywhere inside the unknown
region, the secrecy performance is limited by the minimum
distance from the unknown region to the serving BS. As long
as the minimum distance is the same, the secrecy performance
stays the same regardless of the shape of the unknown region.
D. Achievable Secrecy Rate
Firstly, if we suppose the ideal case where the serving
BS located at x knows the locations of all eavesdroppers,
which requires the location and identity information of all
users is shared completely through the backhaul network, the
maximum secrecy rate achievable at the typical mobile user
is given by [4], [24]
Rs = max
{
log2
(
1 +
Prx(0, x)
σ2
)
− log2
(
1 +
Prx(e
∗(x), x)
σ2
)
, 0
}
, (2)
where
e∗(x) = argmax
e∈Φe
Prx(e, x) = arg min
e∈Φe
‖e− x‖, (3)
i.e., e∗(x) is the location of the most detrimental eavesdropper,
which is the nearest one from the serving BS in this case.
Then, assuming limited information exchange between BSs,
there will be areas in which the eavesdroppers’ location
information is unknown to the serving BS, which is denoted by
Θ ⊂ R2. When this happens, the serving BS assumes the worst
case, i.e., eavesdroppers can lie at any points in Θ. Then the
achievable secrecy rate is still given by (2), but e∗(x) should
be given as
e∗(x) = arg max
e∈Φe∪Θ
Prx(e, x), (4)
where the detrimental eavesdropper is chosen from the union
of the eavesdropper set Φe and the unknown areas Θ.
It should be noticed that the randomness introduced by ΦBS
and Φe makes the achievable secrecy rate Rs at the typical user
be a random variable. Furthermore, the distribution of Rs is
mixed, i.e., Rs has a continuous distribution on (0,∞) and a
discrete component at 0.
By assuming that the receivers of both legitimate us-
er and eavesdroppers are operated in the high signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) regime, i.e., Prx(0, x)/σ2 ≫ 1 and
Prx(e
∗(x), x)/σ2 ≫ 1, we can obtain an approximation of
Rs denoted by Rˆs, i.e., Rˆs = max
{
log2
(
Prx(0, x)/σ
2
)
−
log2
(
Prx(e
∗(x), x)/σ2
)
, 0
}
, whose CCDF can be derived as
F¯Rˆs(R0) = P
(
‖e∗(x)− x‖ > β1/α‖x‖
)
,
where R0 > 0, (5)
where the threshold β is defined as β , 2R0 . In this work, we
focus on high SNR scenarios and use the above expression to
obtain tractable results on the secrecy rate performance. The
obtained analytical results give approximations on the secrecy
performance at finite SNR values.
Furthermore, from the fact that the achievable secrecy rate
Rs should always be non-negative, we can easily reach the
conclusion that the high SNR approximation F¯Rˆs(R0) serves
as an upper bound for the CCDF of Rs at finite SNR.
Therefore, our analytical results on F¯Rˆs(R0) and E[Rˆs] under
the high SNR assumption, give valid upper bounds on the
secrecy performances at finite SNR values.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we provide the main results on the prob-
abilistic characteristics of the achievable secrecy rates Rˆs
and the average secrecy rates achievable E[Rˆs] under the
assumption that the serving BS can partially or fully acquire
the location information of the eavesdroppers, corresponding
to the different levels of BS cooperation introduced. It should
be noticed that the BS cooperation considered in this paper
includes only exchanging the identity and location information
of the mobile users.
A. Location and identity information exchange limited with
neighboring cells only
In order to characterize how the availability of the location
and identity information affects the secrecy performance,
we will investigate the secrecy rate for the case where the
location information and identity exchange is restricted among
neighboring cells only.
We define the (closed) ball centered at p and of radius
r as B(p, r), i.e., B(p, r) , {m ∈ R2, ‖m − p‖ 6 r}.
Here, we apply the following model to represent the known
and unknown regions: only the location information of the
eavesdroppers with a distance less than D0 from the serving
BS is available to it, i.e., the eavesdroppers outside the area
B(x,D0) are unknown to a BS at x, as shown in Fig. 1. The
value D0 is called detection radius in our analysis. Indeed,
the detection radius models the distance from the serving BS
to the nearest point in the unknown region. As discussed
in Section II-C, as long as the minimum distance from the
unknown region remains the same, the secrecy performance
stays the same regardless of the shape of the unknown region.
Therefore, the consideration of a disk-shape known region
does not lose the generality of the result on secrecy rates.
From a network design perspective, a larger D0 represents
information exchanging feasible with BSs farther away, and
in other words, a larger D0 means more BSs participate in
the information exchange with the serving BS. This scenario
provides limited information exchange, which reflects practical
considerations, such as the limited bandwidth of the backhaul
network and the complexity introduced by extensive informa-
tion sharing in practical implementation. By investigating how
the achievable secrecy rate changes with D0, one can obtain
insights on the improvement in the secrecy performance as
more BSs participate in the information exchange process.
Proposition 1: When the detection radius is D0, the CCDF
of the achievable secrecy rate obtained at the typical user is
given by
F¯Rˆs(R0) =
(
1− exp
[
− pi(λe + λBS2
−
2R0
α )D0
2
])
·
1
1 + λeλBS · 2
(2R0)/α
, where R0 > 0. (6)
Proof: Based on the available location information of
eavesdroppers with a distance less than D0 and the typical
user served by the nearest BS at x0, (5) can be derived as
follows,
F¯Rˆs(R0) = P
(
‖e∗(x0)− x0‖ > β
1/α‖x0‖
)
= P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β
1
α ru); ru < β
−
1
αD0
]
,
(7)
where x0 denotes the nearest BS from the origin and ru is
the distance from the typical user to the nearest BS, namely,
ru = ‖x0‖ , the probability density function (pdf) of ru has
been provided in [25], as
fru(r) = 2piλBSr exp(−piλBSr
2). (8)
Hence, (7) becomes
F¯Rˆs(R0)
=
∫ β− 1αD0
0
P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β
1
α ru) | ru = y
]
fru(y)dy
(a)
=
∫ β− 1αD0
0
P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β
1
α y)
]
fru(y)dy
(b)
=
∫ 2−R0α D0
0
2piλBSy exp(−piλe2
2R0
α y2 − piλBSy
2)dy
=
1
1 + λeλBS · 2
(2R0)/α
·
(
1− exp
[
− pi(λe + λBS2
−
2R0
α )D0
2
])
, (9)
where step (a) follows the independence between Φe and
ΦBS , and step (b) is derived based on the null probability of
PPP and the pdf of ru. It should be noticed that the probability
expression P
[
No Eve within B(x0, β
1
α y)
]
is only dependent
on the density of eavesdroppers λe and the ball’s area piβ2/αy2
and independent of x0. The integration from 0 to 2−
R0
α D0
gives the result which completes the proof.
Corollary 1: When the detection radius is D0, the average
secrecy rate achievable at the typical user is provided by
E[Rˆs] =
α
2 ln 2
· ln
(λBS + λe
λe
)
−
α
2 ln 2
·
[
E1
(
piλeD
2
0
)
− E1
(
pi(λe + λBS)D
2
0
)]
, (10)
where E1(x) =
∫
∞
x
exp(−t)1t dt is the exponential integral.
Proof: Based on the CCDF expression given in Proposi-
tion 1, the average secrecy rate achievable at the typical user
can be provided by integrating (6) from 0 to ∞,
E[Rˆs] =
∫
∞
0
1
1 + λeλBS · 2
(2t)/α
·
(
1− exp
[
− pi(λe + λBS2
−
2t
α )D20
])
dt
=
∫
∞
0
1
1 + λeλBS · 2
(2t)/α
dt
−
∫
∞
0
exp
[
− pi(λe + λBS2
−
2t
α )D20
]
1 + λeλBS · 2
(2t)/α
dt, (11)
where the former part of the last step can be derived by using
the indefinite integral result in [26], i.e.,∫
∞
0
1
1 + λeλBS · 2
(2t)/α
dt
=
[
1
ln(22/α)
· ln
(
exp
[
ln(22/α)t
]
1 + λeλBS · exp
[
ln(22/α)t
]
)]∞
0
=
1
ln(22/α)
ln
( 1
λe/λBS
)
−
1
ln(22/α)
ln
( 1
1 + λe/λBS
)
=
α
2 ln 2
· ln
(λBS + λe
λe
)
. (12)
The latter part of (11) can be derived as,
∫
∞
0
exp
[
− pi(λe + λBS2
−
2t
α )D20
]
1 + λeλBS · 2
(2t)/α
dt
= exp(−piλeD
2
0)
∫
∞
0
exp
[
− piλBSD
2
0 · 2
−
2t
α
]
1 + λeλBS · 2
(2t)/α
dt
(a)
= exp(−piλeD
2
0)
∫
∞
λe
λBS
exp(−piλeD
2
0v
−1)
1 + v
·
1
v ln(22/α)
dv
(b)
=
α exp(−piλeD
2
0)
2 ln 2
∫ pi(λBS+λe)D20
piλeD20
1
s exp(s− piλeD20)
ds
=
α
2 ln 2
∫ pi(λBS+λe)D20
piλeD20
1
s exp(s)
ds
=
α
2 ln 2
[
E1
(
piλeD
2
0
)
− E1
(
pi(λe + λBS)D
2
0
)]
, (13)
where the step (a) and the step (b) are obtained by employing
changes of variables v = λeλBS ·2
(2t)/α and s = piλeD
2
0
v +piλeD
2
0
respectively, and the last step can be derived by using the
definition of the exponential integral. Plugging (13) into (11)
gives the desired result in (10), which completes the proof.
Remark: As expected, the general trend can be understood
as follows: when detection radius D0 decreases, the location
information of eavesdroppers surrounding the serving BS
reduces, which makes a lower probability to maintain the
secrecy rate larger than R0.
B. Extreme Case: Full Information Exchange
Next, we consider the case: all eavesdroppers’ location
information is accessible to the serving BS, which can be
achieved by an ideal information exchange among all the
BSs. This case can be viewed as the extreme case of the one
presented in Section III-A, by increasing the detection radius
D0 to infinity.
Proposition 2: With the availability of full location infor-
mation for all eavesdroppers, the CCDF of the achievable
secrecy rate obtained at the typical user is given by
F¯Rˆs(R0) =
1
1 + λeλBS · 2
(2R0)/α
, where R0 > 0. (14)
Proof: The equation (14) can be easily obtained by
substituting the condition of D0 →∞ into (6).
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Fig. 2. The average secrecy rate achievable versus the detection radius D0
(location information for users with a distance less than D0). Simulation and
tractable results are shown for λBS = 1 and path loss exponent α = 4.
Corollary 2: With the availability of full location informa-
tion for all eavesdroppers, the average secrecy rate achievable
at the typical user is provided by
E[Rˆs] =
α
2 ln 2
· ln
(λBS + λe
λe
)
. (15)
Proof: This proof can be done based on (12).
IV. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section, we present numerical results on the achiev-
able secrecy rates. Here we define the value SNR as the
received SNR from the serving BS at the distance r = 1,
i.e. SNR = PBS/σ2. All simulation results are conducted
under a high SNR condition SNR = 20dB, and unitary BS
density, i.e., λBS = 1, to compare with our analysis for the
purpose of model validation.
By presenting the average secrecy rate achievable versus
the detection radius D0 in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we can see
the importance of eavesdroppers’ location information on the
secrecy performance. In case of relatively small values of D0,
any increase of the detection radius brings remarkable benefit
to the achievable secrecy rate. On the other hand, in case of
large D0, any further increase in the detection radius does not
substantially impact the secrecy rate, since the eavesdropper
that limits the secrecy performance is usually located not too
far away from the serving BS and its distance is likely to
be smaller than D0 when D0 is sufficiently large. Take the
curve with α = 4 and λe = 0.1 for instance, the secrecy
performance improves significantly as D0 is increased up to
2, and any further increase from D0 = 2 has a limited effect.
This performance trend over the range of detection radius can
be utilized to appropriately choose the number of neighboring
BSs for information exchange in order to achieve a good
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Fig. 3. The average secrecy rate achievable versus the detection radius D0
(location information for users with a distance less than D0). Simulation and
tractable results are shown for λBS = 1 and path loss exponent α = 2.5.
secrecy performance whilst taking the implementation cost of
such information exchange into consideration. It should be
noticed that the slight mismatches between simulation and
tractable results in these figures come from the high SNR
assumption used in our analysis, and become almost invisible
at SNR = 30dB (plot omitted for brevity).
For each curve in Fig. 4, we show the extreme case’s
average secrecy rates achievable in Section III-B, for both
path loss exponents of α = 4 and α = 2.5. As can be
seen the curves representing the analytical expression (15) in
Corollary 2 match with the simulated results.
Another fact clearly shown from Fig. 2 to Fig. 4 is that
better performance can be obtained for larger values of path
loss exponent α, e.g., the average secrecy rate achievable is
higher for α = 4 than the counterpart for α = 2.5. This is
because the resultant larger path loss from larger α indicates
worse signal condition both to the eavesdroppers and typical
user, whereas the former effect turns out to be more influential
on secrecy performance.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the secrecy performance of cellular
networks considering information exchange between BSs po-
tentially provided by the carrier-operated high-speed backhaul
and core-networks. Using the tools from stochastic geometry,
tractable results to characterize the secrecy rate were obtained
under different ranges of the location information exchange
between BSs. The numerical results validated the tractable ex-
pressions, which provided the important message: the location
information plays a crucial role in determining the average
secrecy rate achievable at the typical user. A near optimal
secrecy rate performance can usually be achieved by allowing
a small number of neighboring BSs to exchange information.
Our analytical result helps network designers to achieve good
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Fig. 4. The average secrecy rate achievable versus the eavesdropper
density λe for full location and identity information exchange. Simulation
and tractable results are shown for different pathloss exponents α.
secrecy performance whilst keeping the complexity and over-
head at a minimal level.
The result in this work applies to scenarios where a carefully
planned frequency reuse pattern is assumed, and the serving
BS can occupy some resource blocks exclusively in a relatively
large area. In future cellular networks, however, interference
will become an important factor. Since the channel conditions
of both legitimate user and eavesdropper will be degraded
by introducing interference, the impact of the co-channel
interference on the secrecy performance of large scale cellular
network is still unknown. Another limitation is that the BS
cooperation considered in this paper is confined to loca-
tion information exchange. Coordinated multipoint (CoMP)
transmission, as an emerging BS cooperation technique in
future cellular networks, can be potentially utilized, and the
benefit on secrecy performance is an interesting problem to
investigate.
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